A Sailor, a Security Clearance, and the Dark Web
A Royal Navy sailor holding high-level security clearance appeared at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Thursday, charged with offences under the National Security Act 2023, after allegedly using the dark web to establish contact with Russian authorities and preparing to transmit classified British defence and intelligence material to a foreign power. The case, brought by Counter Terrorism Policing London, represents one of the more striking espionage prosecutions to emerge under the legislation passed two years ago.
Teddy Stanley Greenidge Young, 24, of Clapham, Bedfordshire, is accused of abusing his position as a Royal Navy warfare intelligence rating to access and retain sensitive information during his first operational deployment, which began on November 4, 2024. He was not asked to enter a plea during the four-minute hearing before District Judge Annabel Pilling, who remanded him in custody and committed the case to the Old Bailey, where he is due to appear on October 16.
The Charges and Their Scope
The Crown Prosecution Service set out the allegations in written form to the court. According to that summary, Young “accessed and retained sensitive UK defence and intelligence material and engaged in activity consistent with preparing to pass protected information to a foreign power” — conduct the prosecution frames not as an isolated lapse but as a sustained, deliberate pattern of behaviour spanning approximately six months.
The charges cover the period between November 26, 2024, and May 21, 2025. Young faces two distinct counts: first, engaging in conduct preparatory to the commission of an offence under the National Security Act 2023; and second, obtaining, accepting, or retaining material benefit from a designated body — a designation that, under the Act, refers to foreign intelligence services or entities acting in their interest.
Prosecutors allege that Young drafted a message “seeking to make contact with a potential threat actor,” that he used the dark web as the vehicle for that attempted communication, and that he separately violated Royal Navy regulations by copying protected information to a private email account. The combination of these alleged acts, taken together, forms the basis of the preparatory conduct charge.
From Recruitment to Arrest: A Timeline
Young joined the Royal Navy in April 2024, meaning the alleged offences began within months of his enlistment and during what prosecutors describe as his first deployment. He was initially arrested in Hampshire — the county that houses several major naval installations, including HMNB Portsmouth — at some point in 2024, before being arrested a second time by counter-terrorism officers at his Bedfordshire home on Tuesday of this week.
The speed of the alleged trajectory — from new recruit to individual charged with preparing to betray classified intelligence to a foreign power — raises pointed questions about the vetting and monitoring processes applied to personnel granted access to sensitive intelligence systems. Young held what the CPS describes as “high level security clearance and intelligence-system access,” a status that ordinarily requires rigorous background investigation before it is granted.
Legal Framework: The National Security Act 2023
The National Security Act 2023, under which Young is charged, replaced and significantly expanded the Official Secrets Acts as the primary legislative instrument governing espionage, foreign interference, and preparatory conduct in the United Kingdom. The Act introduced, among other provisions, the offence of foreign interference and broadened the scope of preparatory offences, allowing prosecution at an earlier stage of an alleged plot than was previously possible.
The second charge — obtaining or retaining material benefit from a designated body — reflects a provision specifically designed to target financial or other inducements offered by foreign intelligence services, though prosecutors have not publicly specified the nature of any alleged benefit in Young’s case. The use of both charges simultaneously suggests the prosecution intends to establish both the intent to assist a foreign power and the existence of a relationship with one.
Institutional Context and Parallel Investigations
Authorities were explicit in stating that Young’s case bears no connection to the ongoing investigation centred on RAF Fairford, the Gloucestershire air base used by United States strategic bombers and a site of considerable intelligence sensitivity. The clarification was notable, arriving as it did at a moment when British counterintelligence has faced sustained scrutiny over multiple concurrent security breach investigations.
The Royal Navy declined to comment substantively, with a spokesman stating only that “a member of the Royal Navy has been charged with National Security Act offences following an investigation by Counter Terrorism Policing London” and that the active legal proceedings precluded further comment. That restraint is standard practice, but it leaves unanswered the question of how long internal concerns about Young’s conduct had been developing before his arrest — and whether the intelligence material he allegedly accessed or retained has been fully accounted for.
What Remains Unknown
The evidentiary record available at this stage is, by design, limited. Magistrates’ court proceedings in cases of this gravity serve primarily as a procedural gateway to the Crown Court, and the Thursday hearing lasted just four minutes. The substance of the prosecution’s case — the precise nature of the classified material allegedly accessed, the identity of any Russian interlocutors, and the question of whether any information was successfully transmitted — will be tested at the Old Bailey in October.
What the charging documents do establish, with some precision, is the prosecution’s theory: that a young man granted privileged access to Britain’s intelligence architecture attempted, within months of receiving that access, to weaponise it on behalf of a foreign power. Whether the evidence sustains that theory remains, at this stage, a matter of legal proceeding rather than established fact.

